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Abstract
Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL is one the latest decisions in which the CJEU has been directly confronted
with the concept of disability in the realm of EU anti-discrimination legislation. In particular, in this
judgment, the Court attempted to identify when the dismissal of a worker due to temporary
incapacity of an unknown duration may constitute direct discrimination on the grounds of dis-
ability. This decision appears to be significant in that, for the first time, the CJEU discusses the
meaning of ‘long-term limitation’ for the purpose of Directive 2000/78. Although the Court treads
carefully, it attempts to further elucidate and bring new elements to the definition of disability in EU
anti-discrimination law. In spite of the fact that the Court is potentially widening the notion of
disability, it appears, once again, quite reticent in its approach to the role of social, environmental
and attitudinal barriers in disabling an individual, and remains somewhat ‘trapped’ in the medical
model of disability. All in all, this analysis endeavors to highlight that the CJEU is struggling to move
beyond a rhetorical recognition of the social model of disability and to apply this in practice.
Keywords
Directive 2000/78, disability, social model of disability, medical model of disability, long-term
limitation, discriminatory dismissal
Introduction
Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL1 is one of the latest decisions in which the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) has been directly confronted with the concept of disability in relation
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to the scope of application of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation (Directive 2000/78).2 In this judgment, the Court sought
to clarify when the dismissal of a worker due to temporary incapacity of an unknown duration may
constitute direct discrimination on the grounds of disability, and, once again, to explain what
‘disability’ means for the purpose of the Directive.
This ruling appears to be one of the newest episodes in a long ‘saga’ which commenced, over
eleven years ago, with the infamous Chaco´n Navas case.3 In that case, the Luxembourg judges had
adopted a medical model-oriented interpretation of disability,4 focusing on the health condition of
the person.5 They had held that the concept of disability referred to a ‘limitation which results from
physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person
concerned in professional life’, identifying the cause of the limitation in the individual impairment,
irrespective of the role played by environmental barriers. In this heavily criticised decision, the
Court had clearly severed the concept of sickness from that of disability, making no distinction
between long-term or chronic diseases and short-term illnesses. The definition adopted in Chaco´n
Navas remained the sole prescriptive definition of disability until 2013, when the Ring and Werge6
decision was released.7
Ring and Werge marks a ‘paradigm shift in the Court’s case-law’.8 This shift was prompted by
the ratification by the EU of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD),9 and was grounded in the principle of consistent interpretation governing the relationship
between international treaty law and EU law. In observance of this principle, the Court compelled
itself to interpret Directive 2000/78 in compliance with the CRPD. It attempted to embrace the
social model of disability10 i.e. the view of disability as stemming from the interaction between
impairments and various environmental and societal barriers, which informs the CRPD. The Court
made it clear that Directive 2000/78 is not intended to solely cover disabilities that are congenital
or result from accidents, to the exclusion of those caused by illnesses. The Luxembourg judges
affirmed that ‘if a curable or incurable illness entails a limitation which results in particular from
physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may
hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal
2. Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16.
3. Case C-13/05, Sonia Chaco´n Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, ECLI: EU: C:2006:456.
4. The ‘medical model’ focused on the health condition of the single person and conceptualised disability as a negative
condition. It identified disability with the individual’s impairment.
5. L. Waddington, ‘Case C-13/05, Chaco´n Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 July
2006’ 44 CML Rev. (2007), 487; D. Hosking, ‘European Developments. A High Bar for EU Disability Rights. Case
C-13/05, Chaco´n Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA’ (2007) Industrial Law Journal, 228-237.
6. Joined cases C- 335/11 and C- 337/11, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab
(C-335/11) andHK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf
of Pro Display A/S, EU: C:2013:222.
7. S. Favalli and D. Ferri, ‘Defining Disability in the EU Non-Discrimination Legislation: Judicial Activism and Leg-
islative Restraints’, (2016) 22 EPL 5-35.
8. Opinion of AG Wahl in Z. v A Government Department and The Board of management of a community school, (Case
C-363/12) at para 88.
9. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted in 2006 by the UN General Assembly, was
ratified by the EU through Council Decision 2010/48/EC, [2010] OJ L 23/35.
10. On the social model, among many others, see C. Barnes and G. Mercer, Exploring Disability, 2nd ed. (Polity Press,
2010).
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basis with other workers, and the limitation is a long-term one, such an illness can be covered by
the concept of ‘‘disability’’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78’.
Ring and Werge, aside from representing a turning point in the Court’s jurisprudence, has
opened a sort of ‘Pandora’s box’. A series of preliminary references from national judges about
the meaning of disability have been made since 2013 and these have provoked a great deal of
critical academic commentary,11 because the Court, while openly referring to the social model of
disability, disregarded it in practice.12 This contradictory approach of the CJEU was evident in Z. v
A Government Department.13 The case concerned a woman, Mrs Z, who had a rare condition
causing infertility and had a baby by means of a surrogate mother in California. Following the birth
of her child, Mrs Z was refused a paid leave equivalent to maternity or adoption leave on the
grounds that the law did not provide for paid leave in the case of a surrogacy arrangement. Mrs Z
brought a complaint before the Irish Equality Tribunal, arguing that she had been subject to
discrimination on the grounds of sex, family status and disability. In considering whether a
discrimination on the ground of disability had occurred, the CJEU tried to ascertain whether Mrs
Z could in fact be considered a person with a disability. The Court found that ‘the inability to have
a child by conventional means does not in itself, in principle, prevent the commissioning mother
from having access to, participating in or advancing in employment’, and concluded that Mrs Z did
not have a disability within the meaning of the Directive. In doing so, however, the Court relied on
the limited scope of the directive ratione materiae, to narrow down the definition of disability.14
Subsequently, in Kaltoft,15 and Glatzel,16 the Court once again made it evident a certain ‘reluc-
tance’17 to focus on the social barriers. These cases demonstrated an uneasiness on the Court’s part
in dealing with the social model. In particular, in Kaltoft the European judges were confronted with
the question as to whether or not obesity constituted a disability for the purpose of the Directive.
The Court ultimately held that obesity does not in itself constitute a disability within the meaning
of Directive 2000/78/EC. However, ‘in the event that, under given circumstances, the obesity of
the worker concerned entails a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or
psychological impairments that in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effec-
tive participation of that person in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and the
11. L. Waddington & A. Lawson, ‘The unfinished story of EU disability non-discrimination law’ in Bogg, Costello, &
Davies (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) 474-491; C. O’Brien, ‘Union Citizenship
and Disability: Restricted Access to Equality Rights and the Attitudinal Model of Disability’ in D. Kochenov, EU
Citizenship and Federalism (CUP, 2017), 509-539. See also L. Waddington, ‘Saying all the right things and still getting
it wrong: the Court of Justice’s definition of disability and non-discrimination law’ (2015)MJ 576-591; L.Waddington,
‘‘‘Not Disabled Enough’’: How European Courts Filter Non-Discrimination Claims Through a Narrow View of
Disability, ‘‘Pas suffisamment handicap’’: comment les cours europe´ennes filtrent les actions en discrimination par une
apprehension e´troite de la notion de handicap’ (2015) European Journal of Human Rights, 11-35.
12. See O’Brien, supra note 11.
13. Case C-363/12, Z. v A Government Department and The Board of management of a community school, EU:
C:2013:604.
14. Waddington & Lawson, supra note 11.
15. Case C-354/13, Fag og Arbejde (FOA), acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft, v Kommunernes Landsforening (KL),
acting on behalf of the Municipality of Billund, EU: C:2014:2463.
16. Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern EU: C:2014:350. For a comment to this decision see C. O’Brien,
‘Driving Down Disability Equality? Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of 22 May 2014’
(2014) MJ, 723-738.
17. European Disability Forum, Alternative Report to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available
at http://www.edf-feph.org/sites/default/files/2015_03_04_edf_alternative_report_final_accessible.pdf.
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limitation is a long-term one, obesity can be covered by the concept of ‘‘disability’’ within the
meaning of Directive 2000/78’.18 As noted by Waddington, the CJEU’s definition of disability
places an emphasis on the physical limitations directly caused by the obesity. 19 In that case, Mr
Kaltoft claimed that he was able to perform his job, and that the barriers he faced were most likely
determined by negative attitudes and stigma. However, for the CJEU, the sole existence of physical
limitations (which in conjunction with external barriers hamper participation in professional life)
could make Mr Kaltoft fall within the category of disability. The very same approach can be found
in the opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Conejero.20 In this instance, and echoing Kaltoft, the AG
stated that disability occurs where ‘the obesity of the worker concerned hindered his full and
effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers on account of
reduced mobility or the onset, in that person, of medical conditions preventing him from carrying
out his work or causing discomfort when carrying out his professional activity’. The same wording
was used by the CJEU in its recent decision on the case.21
Along this line of cases, Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL demonstrates a renewed effort on the part of
the CJEU to embrace the social model, albeit with similarly ambiguous results. Daouidi v Bootes
Plus SL is, however, of particular interest because, as noted by Waddington in a timely annotation
of the case,22 the Court had the possibility to focus on ‘another dimension’ of its own definition of
disability. In each of the previous decisions, the Court had stipulated that the impairment and the
limitation deriving from it, which, in interaction with other barriers, entails a disability, must be
‘long-term’. However, it did not enter into any discussion of what ‘long-term’ means. This very
question lies at the centre of Daouidi.
Against this background, this commentary, after briefly outlining the judgment itself,
critically discusses the approach taken by the Court in Daouidi in light of previous decisions
adopted by the CJEU. It first focuses on the meaning of ‘long-term limitation’ given by the
CJEU and examines its compliance with the letter and the spirit of the CRPD. It then turns to
appraise the absence of any meaningful reference to the role of attitudinal and environmental
barriers. Following directly on from this, the article explores some of the possible conse-
quences and drawbacks of the approach adopted by the Court in this judgment. Finally, the
concluding section argues that Daouidi places itself in continuity with the previous jurispru-
dence of the Court and shows the difficulty faced by the Court in approaching the definition
of disability from the perspective of the social model. However, it also posits that this
decision leaves the door open to an increased level of protection against dismissal for
employees temporarily unable to work.
18. Kaltoft, supra note 15, at para. 59.
19. Waddington, ‘Saying all the right things and still getting it wrong: the Court of Justice’s definition of disability and
non-discrimination law’, supra note 11, at 587.
20. Opinion of AG Sharpston in Carlos Enrique Ruiz Conejero v Ferroser Servicios Auxiliares SA and Ministerio Fiscal
(Case C270/16) ECLI: EU: C:2017:788
21. Case C-270/16, Carlos Enrique Ruiz Conejero v Ferroser Servicios Auxiliares SA and Ministerio Fiscal ECLI: EU:
C:2017:788, para. 30
22. L. Waddington, ‘Non-discriminatie, handicap, definitie van de grond handicap, begrip langdurige beperkingen
(Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL e.a.)’ (2017) European Human Rights Cases.
72 European Labour Law Journal 10(1)
Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL
Facts and Context
The decision originates from a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU raised by
the Social Court of Barcelona (Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Barcelona), in the course of the
disability discrimination proceeding between Mohamed Daouidi and Bootes Plus SL, the Wages
Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantı´a Salarial) and the Spanish Fiscal Public Prosecutor (Minis-
terio Fiscal). Mr Daouidi had been employed by Bootes Plus as a kitchen assistant in a hotel
restaurant in Barcelona for over six months, when, in October 2014, he slipped on the kitchen floor.
In doing so, he dislocated his left elbow. Following the accident, Mr Daouidi promptly undertook
the national procedure to have his temporary incapacity recognised, and informed his employer
that he could not return to work immediately. In November 2014, Mr Daouidi received a notice of
dismissal from Bootes Plus. Unlike in Chaco´n Navas, where the employer did not state any reason
and acknowledged that the dismissal was unlawful, and differently from Kaltoft, where the obesity
of the worker was somewhat mentioned by the employer before the actual dismissal, in this
instance Bootes Plus alleged the worker’s poor performance as the basis on which they discharged
him from his duties. Even though, just a few months prior to the accident, Bootes had converted his
initial three-month contract of part-time occasional employment into a full-time contract and
extended it by nine months, the notice of disciplinary dismissal was ostensibly based on the fact
that Mr. Daouidi ‘did not meet the expectations of the undertaking or perform at the level the
undertaking considers appropriate or suitable for the discharge of your duties in the workplace’.23
In December 2014, Mr Daouidi challenged his dismissal in front of the Social Court and sought a
declaration that it was void by virtue of a breach of his fundament right to physical integrity, as
well as being discriminatory on the grounds of disability. Mr Daouidi’s claim was made on the
basis of Spanish Law 36/2011, which distinguishes between unfair dismissal, which gives rise to a
right to be reinstated in the job or to be compensated, and discriminatory dismissal or dismissal in
breach of the fundamental rights and public freedoms of workers which are null and void. In the
latter circumstance, thus when the dismissal is null, Article 113 of Law 36/2011 establishes that ‘an
order shall be made for the immediate reinstatement of the worker and for payment of the wages
outstanding’. The Social Court of Barcelona considered Mr Daouidi’s claim well-founded and
decided that his dismissal was in fact motivated by his forced absence from work for an indeter-
minate period of time. However, the Social Court decided to stay the proceeding and refer the
matter for preliminary ruling. Being unable to determine whether the worker’s dismissal was void
on the basis of inconsistent national case law, the Juzgado asked five (quite convoluted) questions,
which embraced both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and (to a limited
extent) Directive 2000/78. First, it asked whether, in essence, the decision of an employer to
dismiss a worker due to his temporary incapacity (but of an indeterminate duration) constitutes
a discrimination for the purpose of Article 21(1) of the Charter. Secondly, it asked whether Article
30 of the Charter, regarding the protection against unjustified dismissal, requires national law on
manifestly arbitrary dismissal to be applied when the discharge infringes a fundamental right. In
addition, it asked whether a dismissal for temporary incapacity, such as that at stake, would come
under the scope of the Charter, and in particular of Articles 3, 15, 31, 34(1) and 35(1), and in such a
case, whether those articles could be directly applied by the national court. Lastly, even though
23. Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, supra note 1, para. 27.
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Spanish legislation includes a definition of disability, which essentially mirrors the CRPD,24 the
Social Court asked whether a dismissal for temporary incapacity could amount to a direct dis-
crimination on the grounds of disability under Directive 2000/78.
‘Lights and Shadows’ in the Advocate General Bot’s Opinion
In his Opinion delivered on 26 May 2016, Advocate General (AG) Bot focused on the fifth
question regarding whether or not the dismissal could have been considered discriminatory on the
ground of disability for the purpose of Directive 2000/78. The AG recalled that the application of
the Charter is limited to situations that fall within the scope of EU law and only in such cases can
provisions of the Charter be relied upon. In establishing ‘whether the subject matter of the main
proceedings relates to the interpretation or application of a rule of EU law other than those set out
in the Charter’, the AG therefore focused on the Directive. The apparent emphasis on the Directive
notwithstanding, the bulk of his analysis was devoted to the concept of disability itself.25
The AG began his Opinion by noting the ratification of the CRPD by the EU, although he did
not explicitly invoke the principle of consistent interpretation referred to by the CJEU in all
previous decisions since Ringe and Werge. He stated that ‘the concept of ‘‘disability’’ within the
meaning of Directive 2000/78 must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in
particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which, in interaction
with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in
professional life on an equal basis with other workers’.26 The AG further affirmed that the CJEU
has adopted an ‘evolving and relatively broad definition of the concept of disability’. This appears
to be an implicit reference to Paragraph e) of the CRPD Preamble, which was unequivocally cited
in Ring and Werge.27
The AG preferred not to engage with the two divergent models of disability, and, quite strik-
ingly, never explicitly mentioned the social model, nor societal and environmental barriers. His
wording appears more cautious than the one adopted in the Glatzel case, where the same AG Bot
had been far clearer in referring to the role of external barriers in creating a disability.28 In the latter
Opinion, he had stated that ‘disability must not be understood according to the degree of the
deficiency at issue, but must be determined having regard to the end result occasioned by that
deficiency in a given social context or environment (emphasis added)’. He had also mentioned that
‘attention must be focused on that consequence and not on the deficiency in itself’, and ‘all
depends upon the environment’.29 AG Wahl, in his Opinion on the case Z. v A Government
Department and the Board of Management of a Community School, had been even more explicit
in the language used (despite the questionable outcome). He forcefully underlined that the CRPD
reflects the social model of disability, and ‘offers more robust and expansive protection against
24. Article 2 of Legislative Decree 1/2013 on the rights of persons with disabilities and their social inclusion of 29
November 2013 (BOE No 289 of 3 December 2013, p. 95635) defines disability as the ‘situation of persons with long-
term impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society
on an equal basis with others’.
25. Opinion of the AG Bot in Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL (C 395/15), ECLI: EU: C:2016:371, para 3.
26. Id. para. 41.
27. Id. para. 40.
28. Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern (C-356/12) EU: C:2014:350, para. 35.
29. Id. para. 36.
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discrimination than a narrow, individual-centred definition’.30 The succinct and more nuanced
wording of AG Bot’s Opinion in the case under discussion can therefore be quite easily contrasted
with previous cases. Arguably, he did not want to encounter the same pointed criticism targeted
towards the CJEU with regard to how it had thus far applied (or not applied) the social model, nor
did he intend to wholly depart from what has been defined a ‘cosmetic approach to the social model
of disability’.31
Using the teleological method of interpretation previously adopted in Ring and Werge and in
Kaltof, the AG recalled that disability encompasses not only the impossibility of exercising a
professional activity, but also ‘a hindrance to the exercise of such activity’, and covers both
congenital disabilities and those originated by an accident or caused by illness.32 The AG was
adamant in stating that the existence of a disability can be established without reference to its
cause. However, he was quite careful in not calling into question the well-established finding in
Chaco´n Navas that sickness cannot as such be regarded as an additional ground for discrimination
in relation to Directive 2000/78, and the consistent case law that prohibits the extension of the
scope of Directive 2000/78 by analogy beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed
exhaustively in its Article 1.
The AG then concluded that Mr Daouidi’s limitation, in interaction with various external
barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in professional life. However, he also affirmed
the need for the national court to establish the long-term nature of that limitation, which seems in
fact to coincide with the long-term impairment requirement. In this respect, the AG took a rather
‘medical turn’, and held that the referring court has to establish the long-term limitation by relying
‘on documents and medical certificates assessing the likely duration of the disability in question’.33
Should it appear from this medical evidence that Mr Daouidi’s limitation ‘as a result of possible
sequelae, it is likely to last longer than the average time needed for an injury such as the one that he
suffered to heal, and is likely to last for a significant period, then that limitation may come within
the definition of ‘‘disability’’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78’.34
Finally, the AG concluded that ‘disability is an objective concept and it is therefore irrelevant to
take account of the subjective views of the employer as to whether the inability to work of the
applicant in the main proceedings was sufficiently long-term or not’.35 The AG also rejected the
French government’s plea that the period of time between the occurrence of an accident at work
and dismissal must be taken into consideration when assessing the long-term nature of the limita-
tion. The AG stated that ‘[s]uch a limitation could unquestionably be regarded as long-term, even if
a worker was dismissed immediately following the accident at work. To adopt the contrary
position would manifestly run counter to the protection of disabled workers, in that it would
encourage employers to dismiss, as quickly as possible, sick or injured workers whose incapacity
for work might become long-term’. It seems clear that the AG is quite conscious of the need to
avoid the potential for employers, concerned about the development of a sickness into a disability
30. Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Z. v A Government Department and the Board of Management of a Community
School, (C 363/12) para. 85.
31. The expression has been used by C. O’Brien, ‘Union Citizenship and Disability: Restricted Access to Equality Rights
and the Attitudinal Model of Disability’, supra note 11, at 519.
32. Opinion of the AG Bot in Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL (C 395/15), paras 40-42.
33. Id. para. 47.
34. Id. para. 47.
35. Id para. 48.
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and the need to avoid the accusation of discriminatory dismissal, to dismiss a worker as soon as he
is temporarily unable to work.
The Court of Justice’s Decision
The judgment of the Court, released on 1 December 2016, followed the exact same pattern and
arrived at the same conclusions as those of the AG Bot. The Court went straight to the fifth
question with the intention of allowing the referring court to determine whether the condition of
Mr Daouidi, i.e. a temporary incapacity of uncertain duration caused by an accident, falls within
the notion of disability within the meaning of Directive 2000/78.
Similar to the AG’s Opinion, and in line with each of the preceding cases, the judgment of the
Court began by recalling the conclusion of the CRPD by the EU, and the fact that Directive 2000/
78 ‘is one of the EU acts relating to matters governed by that Convention’.36 The Court alluded to
the obligation undertaken by the EU to implement and act in compliance with the Convention in
areas falling within the scope of its competences.37 The Court went on to state the need to interpret
the Directive in a manner consistent with the Convention, and referred to the Ring and Werge
definition of disability, modelled on Art. 1 CRPD.38
The Court focused on whether a condition such as that of Mr Daouidi, which is in principle
reversible, could fall within the scope of disability for the purpose of the Directive. Since, accord-
ing to the Court, ‘a limitation resulting from long-term physical, mental or psychological impair-
ments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of
the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and if that limitation
is long-term, it may come within the concept of ‘‘disability’’’, the assessment revolved essentially
on what constitutes a ‘long-term’ limitation.
The reasoning of the Court can be summarised within three main points. First, the Court noted
that the CRPD does not specify what ‘long-term’ means, nor can such a definition be found in EU
law. The Court went on to affirm that no reference to Member States’ law can be made as ‘the
concept of a ‘‘long-term’’ limitation of a person’s capacity, within the meaning of the concept of
‘‘disability’’ referred to by Directive 2000/78, must . . . be given an autonomous and uniform
interpretation’. The Court is clearly aware that the national legislation of the Members States
differ greatly in this respect, and that any deviation from the concept of disability adopted at the
Union level would result in a disparate application of the Directive. The fact that Mr Daouidi
qualifies under Spanish law as ‘temporarily unable to work’ is, therefore, immaterial for the
purpose of establishing whether his limitation is long-term within the meaning of the Directive.39
Secondly, in a similar vein to the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court stressed that an assess-
ment of whether a limitation in one’s capacity is long-term is objective and ‘factual in nature’. It is
based on different sources of evidence ‘established on the basis of current medical and scientific
knowledge and data’.40 Thirdly, in the attempt to provide the national court, which ultimately will
be responsible for conducting this assessment, some guidance, the CJEU affirmed that a limitation
36. Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, supra note 1, para. 40.
37. On the CRPD in the EU legal order see D. Ferri, ‘The conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities by the EC/EU: a constitutional perspective’, (2010) European Yearbook Of Disability Law 47-71.
38. Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, supra note 1, paras 40-45.
39. Id. paras 48-53.
40. Id. paras 57.
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can be considered long-term if ‘the incapacity of the person concerned does not display a clearly
defined prognosis as regards short-term progress’ or is likely to be significantly lengthy.
The Court then turned to the other four questions, but concluded that it had no jurisdiction in
relation to these remaining issues. Since the application of Directive 2000/78 to the case is linked
to the assessment by the referring court on the long-term nature of the limitation, the Luxembourg
judges held that it was not possible for them to argue that the situation comes within the scope of
EU law. Consequently, the Charter of Fundamental Rights remains outside of the scope of the
decision.
Critical Analysis of the Decision
Before delving into the likely consequences that the decision of the Court might have, this section
addresses two main points. First, it examines the meaning of ‘long-term limitation’ given by the
CJEU and its potential compliance with the letter and the spirit of the CRPD. Second, it discusses
the somewhat contradictory nature of decision, which still appears to be embedded within the
medical model, and compares it with the approach adopted by the CRPD Committee.
Long-term Impairments or Long-Term Limitations or Both?
In approaching the fifth and final question of the referring court, the CJEU has focused on whether
the condition of Mr Daouidi, who was dismissed while temporarily unable to work, for an inde-
terminate period of time, is covered by the notion of disability within the meaning of that Directive.
Since, according to the definition given by the CJEU itself, disability entails a ‘limitation resulting
in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which, in interaction
with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in
professional life on an equal basis with other workers’ and that limitation must be long-term, the
CJEU distilled the questions provided by the referring court to what ‘long-term’ means.
While, since Ring and Werge, a long-term limitation deriving from a similarly long-term
impairment (in interaction with other barriers) has been considered the conditio sine qua non that
a disability may exist, in Daouidi the CJEU seems to look at the long-term nature of the limitation,
rather than on the duration of the impairment itself.
It is indeed unclear from the wording of the Court whether the limitation even coincides with the
impairment itself. The CJEU affirms that the ‘UN Convention does not define ‘‘long-term’’ as
regards a physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment. Directive 2000/78 does not define
‘‘disability’’, nor does it clarify the concept of a ‘‘long-term’’ limitation of a person’s capacity for
the purposes of that concept’.41 It could be said from this paragraph that the Court uses limitation
and impairment as interchangeable and synonymous. However, in the remainder of its own anal-
ysis, the Court largely refers to the assessment of the ‘limitation to [the workers’] capacity’ and to
the fact that ‘the ‘‘long-term’’ nature of the limitation must be assessed in relation to the condition
of incapacity, as such, of the person concerned at the time of the alleged discriminatory act adopted
against him’ (emphasis added).42 In the text of the decision in Spanish, but also in the French text,
the word ‘limitation’ represents the pivot within the discussion of the Court.43 Therefore, the
41. Id. para. 49.
42. Id. para. 53.
43. The very same wording is also in the Italian text.
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limitation is arguably the consequence of the impairment, and could be considered a ‘functional
deficit’ using the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).
It remains unclear whether the CJEU is focused on how long the impairment has existed or on
how long it is likely to have a limiting effect, or even both. However, the wording of the decision
seems to lead to the conclusion that the focus must be on how long the impairment has given rise to
a limitation. The CJEU affirms, then, that ‘the evidence which makes it possible to find that such a
limitation is ‘‘long-term’’ includes the fact that . . . the incapacity of the person concerned does not
display a clearly defined prognosis as regards short-term progress or the fact that that incapacity is
likely to be significantly prolonged before that person has recovered’.44 In the case of Mr Daouidi,
six months after the accident his elbow was still in plaster, and the impairment persisted. However,
should the plaster be removed and were Mr Daouidi to recover from the injury, an assessment of
whether limiting effects were still in place would need to be conducted.
On the one hand, the CJEU affirms that a situation of incapacity of uncertain duration does not
automatically lead to a person’s incapacity being classified as ‘long-term’. On the other hand, the
focus on the limitation may imply that short-term injuries or impairments of uncertain duration can
potentially have long-term effects. This may be most evident in cases relating to mental health
issues. A person may experience an episode of depression that lasts for three or four months from
its commencement and diagnosis to full recovery. In this case, the impairment is temporary or
‘short-term’ in itself. However, its consequences may be long term. For example, in order to
maintain appropriate level of mental health, the person might have to ensure that their workload
remains manageable, that they avoid stressful situations, or that they reduce their working time
(e.g. avoid working in the evenings and weekends). This ‘limitation’ would endure for a longer
period of time, if not indefinitely. If the worker can demonstrate, based on medical evidence, that
their condition entails a long-term limitation, their dismissal could be deemed to be discriminatory
on the grounds of disability, and they would be entitled to have reasonable accommodations made
on their behalf. In Ring and Werge, as noted by Bell, the Court acknowledged the complex
relationship between sickness and disability.45 This complex relationship is also somewhat evident
in Daouidi. The CJEU appears aware that a ‘distinction needs to be drawn between situations
where sickness absence is connected to disability and those where it is not’.46 Nonetheless, by
focusing on the limitation of capacity (instead of merely focusing on the impairment that causes it),
it appears to have reached a higher benchmark within its disability jurisprudence and (at least
potentially) expanded the scope of application of the grounds of disability in EU anti-
discrimination law.
Interestingly, it seems that this approach could capture the spirit of Article 1 of the Convention,
which does not explicitly refer to the concept of limitation. Rather, it emphasises impairments.
Article 1 CRPD states that ‘[p]ersons with disabilities include (emphasis added) those who have
long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’.
The letter of this provision, the fact that it is stipulated outside the framework of the definitions
(Art. 2 of the CRPD) should make it clear that this is not a strict characterisation, but an open-
44. Id. para. 56.
45. M. Bell, ‘Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment
Law’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal, 641–656, at 654.
46. Id., at 654.
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ended conceptualisation of disability. It provides minimum grounds for protection to be fulfilled,
not an overall target to be met. Thus, short-term conditions might potentially be included in the
definition of disability in so far as, in conjunction with other barriers, they hamper the full
participation of the person in social and professional life. The CJEU decision seems to open the
door to a somewhat flexible approach regarding the duration of the impairment itself by focusing
on its effects, i.e. on the limitation of capacity deriving from the impairment.
The Role of Social Barriers in the CJEU’s Decision: The ‘Elephant in the Room’
In Daouidi the CJEU focused only on the meaning of ‘‘‘long-term’ limitation of a person’s
capacity for the purposes of that concept [of disability]’. In its attempt to provide the national
court with guidance, the CJEU argues that in order to ascertain the long-term nature of the
limitation it is necessary to rely on ‘current medical and scientific knowledge and data’.47 In its
effort to clarify the meaning of ‘long-term limitation’, the CJEU ends up anchoring its reasoning to
a very medicalised view of disability, and never mentions the role of social and attitudinal barriers.
The CJEU, probably unwittingly, ends up once again in somewhat conflating impairment (or the
limitation deriving from it) and disability: as far as the limitation is long-term, it is disabling.
This approach places the CJEU reasoning in stark contrast with the perspective adopted by the
UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee). While acknowl-
edging that the Committee has a very different role and mandate than that of the CJEU, and despite
the difficulties encountered by the same Committee in translating Article 1 of the CRPD and the
social model into a viable definition of disability, the CJEU approach to temporary incapacity to
work in Daouidi differs dramatically in that it identifies disability with the long-term limitation.
The Court, in line with AG Bot, abandons any attempt to embrace a social construction of disability
and, aside from mentioning the barriers, never refers to the role they play in disabling an individ-
ual. S.C. v Brazil48 is, thus far, the primary (and sole) case49 in which the CRPD Committee, while
ultimately declaring the complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the author had not exhausted
domestic remedies, had the opportunity to elaborate on the concept of disability. Interestingly, in
this case the nature of a long-term impairment was at stake. While the facts that originated the case
are quite different from those of the Daouidi decision, the main legal issue is quite similar. It
concerns the possibility for a temporary incapacity to work to be considered a disability. The
complaint was raised by a Brazilian worker of Banco do Brasil, who was first demoted from her
job of bank teller, after being on medical leave for three months following various motorcycle
accidents, and then refused a transfer to a different branch to work closer to home, despite being
47. Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, supra note 1, para. 57.
48. S.C. v. Brazil, CRPD/C/12/D/10/2013, Decision adopted by the Committee at its twelfth session (15 September–3
October 2014).
49. Interestingly, so far, the CRPD Committee has avoided the discussion of what constitutes a disability. In a decision
adopted in August 2017 in relation to a person with albinism, the Committee once again limits itself to recall Art. 1
CRPD, and, after having recalled what albinism is, affirms that ‘[a] human rights-based model of disability requires the
diversity of persons with disabilities to be taken into account (preamble, para.(i)) together with the interaction between
individuals with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers (preamble, para. (e)).27 In view thereof, and
while noting that the State party does not question the competence ratione materiae of the Committee to address the
author’s complaint, the Committee considers necessary to clarify that albinism falls within the definition of disability
as enshrined by article 1 of the Convention. See Mr. X v Tanzania CRPD/C/18/D/22/2014, Views adopted by the
Committee at its eighteenth session (14 August - 1 September 2017).
Ferri 79
declared chronically ill by her doctor. After an unsuccessful application to the domestic courts, Ms
S.C. raised a complaint before the Committee asking for Brazil to be declared in breach of the
CRPD for having endorsed Banco do Brasil’s discriminatory policy. The State of Brazil, in its
defensive claims, affirmed that S.C.’s communication was inadmissible ratione materiae because
the author was not a person with a disability for the purpose of the Convention. In particular, the
State party claimed that ‘[w]hereas Article 1 of the Convention defines disability as consisting of a
long-term impairment, the author was diagnosed by professionals of the National Institute of Social
Security (INSS) with a temporary incapacity to work (emphasis added)’.50 The wording used by
the State party is clearly informed by the medical model: it conflates disability with the long-term
impairment, as the individual impairment is the disability itself, and focuses on the circumstance
that S.C. had not provided qualifying evidence of a long-term impairment.51 The Committee
rejected the arguments of the State Party and considered that it was not precluded from examining
the communication, implicitly affirming that Ms S.C. could in fact be considered a person with a
disability for the purposes of the CRPD. When considering the issue, the Committee tried to move
away from the medical model. It stated that the Convention makes it clear that ‘persons with
disabilities include, but are not limited to, those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual
or sensory impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and
effective participation in society’.52 Then, the Committee ventured into uncharted territory by
going on to consider that ‘the difference between illness and disability is a difference of degree and
not a difference of kind’, and that a ‘health impairment which initially is conceived of as illness can
develop into an impairment in the context of disability as a consequence of its duration or its
chronicity’.53 This statement clearly endeavored to distinguish the concepts of illness and dis-
ability, and, in this context, duration (arguably long-term) is of crucial importance. However, the
Committee clearly avoided mentioning medical evidence. It did not engage in any discussion on
the duration of the impairment. Rather, the Committee focused on the social context, and high-
lighted the need to consider the author’s physical impairment in interaction with external barriers.
It instead underlined the ‘human rights-based model of disability’, and, in particular, the need for
the diversity of persons with disabilities to be taken into account, in combination with attitudinal
and environmental barriers. This statement makes it immediately evident that the CJEU’s approach
is different from that which was adopted (at least in this decision) by the Committee. Both the AG’s
Opinion and the judgment of the CJEU focus exclusively on the limitation, and, while formally
adhering to the CRPD, they return to a medicalised conception of disability in which the role of
external and environmental barriers is substantially irrelevant. In this respect, the Daouidi case
heightens the dissonance which was already in existence, and that had previously been noted by
scholars in relation to prior case law,54 between the continuous reference to the CRPD and the
substance of the CJEU reasoning.
50. S.C. v. Brazil, para 4.1 (emphasis added).
51. However, the Author herself focused on her impairment and in counteracting the arguments raised by the State claims
to be a person with a disability because she has ‘permanent impairment to her left knee and permanent incapacity to
perform specific tasks’. S.C. v. Brazil, para 5.1 (emphasis added).
52. S.C. v. Brazil, para 6.3 (emphasis added).
53. S.C. v. Brazil, para 6.3 (emphasis added).
54. Among others, L. Waddington, ‘Saying all the right things and still getting it wrong: the Court of Justice’s definition of
disability and non-discrimination law’ (2015) MJ 576-591.
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Looking Ahead: The Challenges Posed by the Daouidi Decision
As demonstrated in the previous section, the CJEU’s renewed attempt to rely on the social model
coupled with a lack of clear indication on the role barriers play in disabling the individual, might be
quite problematic in itself. However, this may also be very difficult to incorporate within the daily
practice of domestic courts. It has already been argued that ‘the real difficulty with the social model
is that it lacks the legal certainty of the medical model, particularly when it comes to evidentiary
matters’, because it ‘blurs the boundaries between the existence or possession of the protected
characteristic and the discriminatory consequences’.55 Hervey and Rostant, reflecting on discrim-
ination on the grounds of disability in cases of people with obesity (or non-ideal weights), show
that ‘the social model, relying upon attitudinal barriers, posits the existence of a protected char-
acteristic established only if and when it can be shown that attitudes, in the form, say, of stereo-
typical thinking, have erected a barrier to full participation, for example a decision not to recruit’.
The physical impairment is not in itself a disability. The latter stems from the interaction between
the impairment and the barriers, including attitudinal barriers, which might be difficult to prove in
practice. The CJEU is certainly aware of this difficulty, and argues that ‘in the context of the
verification of that ‘‘long-term’’ nature, the referring court must base its decision on all the
objective evidence in its possession, in particular on documents and certificates relating to that
person’s condition, established on the basis of current medical and scientific knowledge and
data’.56 Seemingly, the CJEU relies on medical data in the attempt to ensure a firm point of
reference, and to provide some legal certainty to domestic courts that need to decide whether or
not the condition at stake might entail a disability, and to fade away from the difficulty well
explained by Hervey and Rostant in relation to ‘non-ideal weight’ discrimination.57 In the case
of Mr Daouidi, however, the AG clearly states that ‘Disability is an objective concept and it is
therefore irrelevant to take account of the subjective views of the employer as to whether the
inability to work of the applicant in the main proceedings was sufficiently long-term or not’.
Would, however, the views of the employer be otherwise relevant if attitudinal barriers should
be established, for example in stereotyping a future lack of productivity? This is an uneasy
question, which the CJEU has yet to answer, and it is likely to emerge in subsequent cases.
However, the CJEU’s decision in Daouidi presents specific challenges for a national court that
cannot be underestimated.
First, the distinction between the impairment and the limitation remains blurred. Although this
analysis seems to show that the Court considers them being separate concepts, the ‘language of
limitation’ is not unambiguous and one might still argue, contrary to what is posited here, that they
are synonymous with one another. Consequently, it might prove difficult for national courts (and
especially for those members of the judiciary who are not familiar with the conceptualisation of
disability), to navigate the liminal space that appears to exist between ‘sickness’ on the one hand,
and ‘disability’ on the other. This opens up another question, already raised by Hendrickx,58 as to
55. T. Hervey, and P. Rostant, ‘‘‘All About That Bass’’? Is non-ideal-weight discrimination unlawful in the UK?’ (2016)
Modern Law Review, 79: 248–282, at 275.
56. Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL (C-395/15), [59].
57. Hervey, and Rostant, supra note 55.
58. F. Hendrickx, ‘Disability and reintegration in work: interplay between EU non-discrimination law and labour law’, in
F. Hendrickx (ed.) Reasonable Accommodation in the Modern Workplace. Potential and Limits of the Integrative
Logics of Labour Law; Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 2016; Vol. 93; pp. 61 – 72, at 68.
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what extent the evolving concept of disability can be widened in order to expand the scope of
protection offered by disability discrimination law, and whether the dichotomy illness/disability is
really valid.
Secondly, if the national court distinguishes between limitation and impairment, it should then
establish what a ‘long-term’ limitation is. The CJEU anchors this evaluation upon medical data.
However, aside from departing from a social conception of disability, this posits that medical data
will provide ‘objective evidence’ and will be consistent.59 In reality, medical prognoses may differ
greatly, in particular (but not exclusively) in relation to mental health issues.60 Scientific knowl-
edge may not ultimately offer the objective point of reference envisaged by the Luxembourg
judges. This would leave the domestic court in the position of having to decide which medical
report is most reliable based on those provided to it. This conclusion, coupled with the consider-
ation that the burden of proof will end up being inevitably on the person with disability, who will
have to produce extensive medical evidence in order to assuage this same burden,61 might under-
mine the realisation of the objective pursued by the Directive. Even if one is to assume that a
consistent medical prognosis can be obtained, the domestic court will be left with the task of
deciding whether, for example, a seven-month limitation is sufficiently long to fall within the
specific meaning of ‘long-term’. It is arguable that the national court would then quite likely refer
to national law and practice in its evaluation of the long-term limitation, and draw from the
parameters included in national law, if there are any. On the one hand, the CJEU has consistently
held that the fact that a person is qualified as a person with a disability under national law, ‘does not
necessarily indicate that he has a disability within the meaning of Directive 2000/78’.62 On the
other hand, the decision as to whether the person has a long-term limitation for the purpose of the
Directive might lead the national court to turn again to how disability is defined within their
national legal system. This is paradoxical in itself, as it contradicts the rhetoric of uniformity
utilised by the CJEU. The CJEU, in the Daouidi decision, while it does not give a definition of
‘long-term’, and circuitously refers to vague concepts such as hindrance over a ‘long period of
time’ or ‘prolonged’ incapacity, seems to make different national approaches inevitable. As noted
by Waddington and Lawson in 2009,63 and, most recently by Ferri and Lawson,64 national def-
initions of disability differ greatly across the EU. Most of them remain within the medically
oriented model, and focus on the impairment itself and its duration, which can vary greatly. For
example, the UK Equality Act refers to the fact that the condition must last for 12 months (or might
be likely to last for a total of 12 months) in order to be considered long-term. In this vein, it might
seem unlikely that a UK court will consider as long-term an impairment given a seven-month
prognosis. Contrastingly, in Ireland, the legislation does not include any explicit time reference,
59. Waddington, ‘Non-discriminatie, handicap, definitie van de grond handicap, begrip langdurige beperkingen
(Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL e.a.)’ supra note 11, at 29.
60. Id.
61. In this sense also Waddington, ‘Non-discriminatie, handicap, definitie van de grond handicap, begrip langdurige
beperkingen (Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL e.a.)’ (2017) European Human Rights Cases, 29.
62. This was reiterated in Ruiz Conejero, supra note 22, para. 31.
63. L. Waddington and A. Lawson, Disability and non-discrimination law in the European Union: An Analysis of Dis-
ability Discrimination Law Within and Beyond the Employment Field (European Network of Legal experts in the Non-
discrimination Field), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2009, available at: http://www.ec.
europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?%20docId¼6154&langId¼en.
64. D. Ferri and A. Lawson, Reasonable accommodation for disabled people in employment contexts. Publications Office
of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2016.
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but in some documents an example of a long-term condition is that of an impairment which persists
or is likely to persist for at least six months,65 and a similar approach is incorporated within
Austrian law.66 The existence of these often wholly divergent definitions is likely to affect the
way in which domestic courts apply the Directive. Ultimately, while the Court is clearly aware that
the definitions of disability contained within the national legislation of the Members States can
differ quite markedly, and any deviation from the search for an EU dimension of the concept of
disability would result in a disparate application of the Directive, the approach adopted in Daouidi
is likely to fall short in terms of allowing for uniform interpretation of the concept of disability
throughout the EU. Such an approach might also lead us to question whether we can realistically
expect an entirely harmonized definition across the EU, or whether the role of the CJEU in this
respect is to provide general legal criteria for identifying a disability, whilst leaving to national
courts some discretion in relation to how they apply these criteria to specific factual situations
before them.
Concluding Remarks
When, in 2013, the Court of Justice, relying on the obligation to interpret EU secondary law in
compliance with the CRPD, attempted to embrace the social model of disability, it likely hoped
that this would resolve the matter.67 However, Z. v A Government Department and the Board of
management of a community school, Kaltoft and Glatzel have all demonstrated that the concept of
disability for the purpose of EU anti-discrimination law is far from clear. Despite being relatively
succinct, Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL has attracted immediate attention from disability scholars,68 as
it is the latest attempt of the Court to shed light on what disability means in the context of the
implementation of Directive 2000/78. This decision is significant in that the CJEU for the first time
discusses the meaning of ‘long-term limitation’. The Court treads carefully but attempts to further
elucidate and add new elements to the definition of disability in EU anti-discrimination law
established in Ring and Werge. It is quite evident that the lack of a clear definition within EU
legislation has left the CJEU with the uneasy task of constructing a Union-wide definition of
disability for the purposes of EU law. One must be cognisant of the significant attempts made
thus far by CJEU to align EU law with the CRPD in this respect. However, not only has the Court
yet to establish any significant degree of clarity, it has also fallen short of the objective of
incorporating the social model embedded in the CRPD into EU law, in particular when applying
65. See e.g. the HSE – Employers Agency Strategy and Action Plan for the Employment of People with Disabilities in
the Health Service at <http://www.hse.ie/eng/staff/Resources/hrstrategiesreports/Disability%20Strategy%20and%20
Action%20Plan.doc> (last visited 30 May 2017).
66. Federal Disability Equality Act (BGBl. I No. 82/2005).
67. In Commission v Italy – a case which stemmed from an infringement proceeding initiated against Italy for failure to
properly implement Directive 2000/78 in relation to the duty of the employer to provide reasonable accommodation -
the Court simply recalled Ring and Werge and gave the impression that it had reached a point of clarity on the definition
of disability. See Pastore, ‘Disabilita` e lavoro: prospettive recenti della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea’ (2016)
RDSS, 199-224.
68. L. Waddington, ‘Non-discriminatie, handicap, definitie van de grond handicap, begrip langdurige beperkingen
(Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL e.a.)’ (2017) EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, 29; Paolo Addis, ‘La Corte di
Giustizia dell’Unione europea alle prese con una domanda ricorrente: che cos’e` la disabilita`? Nota alla sentenza
Daouidi, 1 dicembre 2016, causa C-395/2015’, (2017) DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMPARATO ED EUROPEO.
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the Directive. The distinction between sickness, on the one hand, and disability, on the other
remains blurred, and arguably this distinction seems hard to maintain.69
The decision in Daouidi has a twofold contradictory outcome. On the one hand, looking at the
text of the decision, the Court seems to draw a distinction between limitation and impairment.
Although one might argue that such a distinction is rather haphazard, it seems that the Court has
established a higher benchmark within its disability jurisprudence and expanded the scope of
application of the grounds of disability by admitting that short-term injuries or impairments of
uncertain duration can potentially have long-term effects. However, on the other hand, upon
engaging in a deeper contextual reading of the judgment, the CJEU remains quite reticent in its
approach to the role of social, environmental and attitudinal barriers in disabling an individual, as
well as being somewhat ‘trapped’ within the medical model of disability. In a similar manner to Z.
v A Government Department and the Board of management of a community school, Kaltoft and
Glatzel, the Luxembourg judges, within their judgment, distanced themselves from the social
model-oriented conceptualisation, and failed to consider the role of social barriers, such as the
perception of a future lack of productivity. The ruling commented on here, thus, continues a now
well-established approach of ‘name-checking’ the CRPD.70 The excessive emphasis on providing
multiple sources of medical evidence in order to define a long-term impairment appears contra-
dictory to the social model of disability, and distant from the approach taken by the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (despite it not having, so far, offered any extensive or
definitive guidance) in S.C. v Brazil.
Finally, the CJEU’s approach to the assessment of a ‘long-term’ impairment is quite likely to
increase the degree of divergence within the interpretation of disability as well as ‘long term’
across the EU, undermining the uniform interpretation of the Directive. Daouidi seems to make
more evident the distance between the ‘rhetoric’ of uniformity and the difficulty in overcoming
different national definitions of and approaches to disability.
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